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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Journalists like myself would like to believe that every story they report to the 
public has a direct impact on their audience and subjects they are writing about. This is, 
more often than not, a highly romanticized version of the field of journalism. However, 
some news coverage can and does result in ripples of change. 
 To evaluate whether American journalism does have the ability to impact foreign 
policy—which, if true, could have humanitarian, national security and democratic 
process implications—we must investigate the relationships between the mainstream 
media, American public opinion, and US foreign policy. I intend to do that by arguing: 
1. There is strong evidence to suggest that public opinion helps shape US foreign 
policy. 
2. There is strong evidence to suggest that mainstream journalism on foreign 
policy shapes public opinion. 
3. Mainstream journalism’s coverage of the Middle East can affect the decision 
making process and the outcomes of that foreign policy.  
4. A serious lack of contextual information in American news coverage on the 
Middle East, heavy with “framing” that promotes ethnocentrism and stereotypes through 
the creation of a narrative bias, results in an ill-informed public opinion. Ultimately, I 
will argue that this detrimentally affects the foreign policy process. 
 
In addition to connecting the dots of these relationships, this thesis will also 
contain a practical element. The latter part of the thesis acts as a resource for journalists 
and news media organizations aspiring to generate a more culturally comprehensive news 
coverage of the Middle East. In the future, I intend to expand this practical resource to 
include even more topics of news coverage; for the purposes of this thesis, the contextual 
background and press analysis is limited to four topics: the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 
militant Islamist groups, the Hajj pilgrimage, and US troops in Saudi Arabia.  
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APPROACH TO DATA COLLECTION 
 
Since there are several different parts to the thesis, the data collection and 
research varies somewhat among them, based on what method was most appropriate for 
that part of my research. To assess how the media, American public opinion and foreign 
policy relate to one another, I rely solely on peer-reviewed academic journal articles and 
scholarly books.  I have written about, wherever relevant, the various schools of thought 
and progression of literature on these issues, as well as concrete examples of evidence for 
the positions, all of which are cited throughout the work.  
 
News Media Database 
In collecting data for my analysis of mainstream journalism, I have relied on 
databases that contain archives of TV and newspaper transcripts, most notably the 
LexisNexis Academic database. I have specifically analyzed two major newspapers, The 
New York Times and The Washington Post, and three TV news networks, CNN, NBC and 
CBS, for their foreign coverage of the Middle East. My reason for selecting these 
mammoths in American news was primarily because of their leadership in setting the 
national conversation. As one scholar noted, when The New York Times publishes a story 
about an event or issue abroad, others often follow.1 Similarly, CNN’s broad network of 
foreign bureaus has earned it a stellar reputation for breaking foreign news. The reason I 
                                                 
1Philip Powlick and Andrew Katz, “Defining the American Public Opinion/Foreign Policy 
Nexus,” Mershon International Studies Review 42, no. 1 (May 1998) 42.  
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did not include ABC News in this analysis is because that network’s international 
coverage was so thin it did not lend itself to this research. 
 
Historical Sources 
For data collected on the contextual information—including historical and 
religious information—which I deemed missing from the mainstream journalism 
coverage I analyzed, I rely on a combination of books, including multiple biographies of 
Muhammad, whom Muslims believe was the final prophet of God. These religious 
sources include The Qur’an as well as hadith collections of, primarily, Al-Bukhari, Al-
Tabari, and Muslim. I have also drawn from nearly a dozen books by scholars of Middle 
Eastern history, including but not limited to Bernard Lewis, John Esposito, Albert 
Hourani, Maxime Rodinson and Karen Armstrong, leaning on those scholars who 
incorporate early religious history into their work for the purpose of trying to understand 
today’s Middle East. 
 
Author’s Use of Ethnographical Research 
I am a journalist who lived and studied in both the pre-September 11 (Egypt) and 
the post-September 11 (Qatar, United Arab Emirates) Middle East.  I lived for seven 
years in a Salafist Muslim home, where Arabic was spoken, with a religious family who 
rendered and published their own English translations of The Qur’an and the hadith 
collections by Al-Bukhari and Muslim.2 One of the household members was at the time, 
                                                 
2 The Glorious Qur’an, translated into English by Ahmad Zidan and Dina Zidan, 1991, 
self-published in Cairo, Egypt. I will not be using this version for my research because it 
is not considered to be among the more objective or accurate of available translations. I 
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and still is, a central figure in the Al-Jazeera network, and the family had deep roots in 
the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.  The home I lived in served as a frequent meeting 
place for Muslim Brotherhood supporters working within Al-Jazeera, which gave me 
insight on their attitudes and beliefs on the media, American foreign policy, and political 
Islam. 
Ethnographical research does not typically begin with a hypothesis and it often 
involves observation and even participation, allowing the researcher to learn through 
experience and firsthand accounting. Along those lines, even though my experience was a 
personal one, and not for the purposes of research at the time, I have since been able to 
glean from what I witnessed during those years and apply my firsthand knowledge of 
certain attitudes and movements to my overall understanding as a scholar. These 
experiences gave me more than just a glimpse into a political rationale and religious 
ideology that has become a noticeable presence in the region and on the world stage, 
namely that of conservative Islamist thinking.  It allowed me to do careful examination, 
data review and analysis of these attitudes in a way that meets the standards of basic 
ethnographical research, in terms of observing patterns and behavior of participants over 
time. 
In addition to my personal experiences mentioned here, I have a firm grasp of 
Modern Standard Arabic, having studied formally and receiving a certificate from the 
Arabic Language Institute, part of the American University in Cairo.  I was a guest of the 
Saudi Arabian royal family on a trip to Mecca in April, 2000, where I observed firsthand, 
                                                 
instead use the more traditional translation: The Holy Qur’an, translated by Abdullah 
Yusuf Ali, 5th Edition, (Hertfordshire: Wordsworth, 2000). 
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on the ground, the Hajj pilgrimage and wrote about it for The Columbia Missourian 
newspaper.  
Through these experiences, I am able to apply an element of ethnographical 
research to this theses, a research method I have limited to only the portions of cultural 
context I find to be missing from mainstream journalism coverage of the articles.  
 
 
A REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
 
Public Opinion’s Influence on US Foreign Policy 
In the years following the Second World War, the prevalent school of thought 
among scholars was that the public was unstable and irrational in terms of foreign policy 
issues.3 The most widespread theory was nicknamed “Mood Theory,” heralded by 
Gabriel Almond in his 1960 book The American People and Foreign Policy. Almond 
argued that the attitudes of most Americans toward foreign policy “lack intellectual 
structure and factual content,” except in times of immediate threat—and that these 
attitudes were subject to volatile “mood” swings of the nation.4  In his 1973 The Public’s 
Impact on Foreign Policy, Bernard Cohen reduced the State Department’s attitude on 
                                                 
3 Phillip J. Powlick, "The Attitudinal Bases for Responsiveness to Public Opinion among 
American Foreign Policy Officials," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 35, no. 4 
(December 1991): 611. 
4 Gabriel Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1960) 
69. 
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public opinion to this quote: “To hell with public opinion…We should lead and not 
follow.”5 
The Vietnam War, however, changed the nexus between public opinion and 
foreign policy, as well as how that relationship was viewed by scholars.6 “Mood Theory” 
gave way to a completely different school of thought in the 1980s, one that actually saw 
the American public’s views on foreign policy as stable, researchable, and valuable in the 
foreign policymaking process.7 What was once dismissed as largely irrelevant to the 
actual decisions made in foreign policy, public opinion, began to emerge as a “significant 
factor in the making of American foreign policy.”8 
In their 1988 research, Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro refuted that mass 
American opinion “moves in capricious or inexplicable ways.”9 Rather, they argued, that 
the public was quite steady and rational in its opinions and assessments of foreign policy.  
That is not to say that the American general public doesn’t change its positions on 
specific leaders or policies over time—because it can, and has, as in the Vietnam War 
era—but Page and Shapiro point out that, when given other policy alternatives, the public 
changes its opinion much less frequently than when merely asked about one, specific 
                                                 
5 Bernard Cohen, The Public’s Impact on Foreign Policy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973) 
62. 
6 Bernard Hennessy, “The Public Impact Upon Foreign Policy,” International Studies 
Quarterly Vol. 12, no. 1 (March 1968): 117. 
7 Powlick, “The Attitudinal Bases for Responsiveness to Public Opinion Among American 
Foreign Policy Officials,” 611. 
8 Donald L. Jordan and Benjamin I. Page, "Shaping Foreign Policy Opinions: The Role of 
TV News," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 36, no. 2 (June 1992): 227. 
9 Robert Shapiro and Benjamin Page, “Foreign Policy and the Rational Public,” The 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 32, no. 2 (June 1988): 243. 
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political “problem.”10 If the public appears confused, they write, the “fault may very well 
lie with the provider of information—or misinformation.”11  
When that information is accurate and fair, Page and Shapiro contend, public 
opinion is stable and rational and should be taken into account in policymaking as a part 
of the democratic process.12  Other scholars take it a step further and suggest that certain 
subgroups of the public, particularly those identified as the “attentive public” who are 
well educated and informed of current events, should have input into the foreign policy 
process.13  The percentage of the American public that fall into the “attentive public” is 
quite small—most estimate between five and 10 percent of the total population.14 
One scholar in particular, Philip Powlick, writes that research shows a correlation 
between public opinion and policy outcomes—and that there is a much more significant 
degree of public influence on foreign policy today than in earlier eras.15 His research, 
published in 1991, included 68 interviews with officials from the State Department and 
the National Security Council. He found that, while American foreign policy officials do 
hope to keep control over their decision making process, they now express “fairly 
responsive attitudes” toward public opinion.16 Similarly, Thomas Risse-Kappen asserts  
                                                 
10 Shapiro and Page, “Foreign Policy and the Rational Public,” 214. 
11 Ibid, 243-44. 
12 Ibid, 244. 
13 Powlick, “The Attitudinal Bases for Responsiveness to Public Opinion Among 
American Foreign Policy Officials,” 612. 
14 Powlick and Katz, “Defining the American Public Opinion/Foreign Policy Nexus,” 37. 
15 Powlick, “The Attitudinal Bases for Responsiveness to Public Opinion Among 
American Foreign Policy Officials,” 612. 
16 Ibid, 613. 
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that one of the main factors enabling a “top-down” approach, in which policy makers 
maintain control over public opinion, is a low degree of knowledge on issues.17  
There are many examples, outside of the Vietnam War era, of public opinion 
directly influencing American foreign policy changes. In the spring of 1989, when 
George H.W. Bush was fresh in office, his initial policy was to be more cautious toward 
Moscow. However, the American public, shedding its fear of the Soviet threat, reacted 
negatively to Bush’s plans. By that summer, the Bush administration had changed its tone 
and assured the public that it firmly supported the new, more open Gorbachev and his 
plans.18  The public sentiments had changed primarily because of what they had learned 
through the news media.19 
Public opinion can directly influence foreign policy in three ways: by changing 
policy goals, changing the order of priorities, and by narrowing the range of options for 
action.20  When applying this idea to public opinion on the conflicts in the Middle East, 
particularly the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, we can see that public opinion actually has the 
ability to play a role in improving conflict-ridden areas.  
Throughout the literature on how public opinion can influence American foreign 
policy, there is a strong emphasis on the accuracy and objectivity of the information that 
the public is receiving. Page and Shapiro write that the key to the public’s rational 
participation in foreign policy matters lies largely in information being “unbiased.”21 
                                                 
17 Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in 
Liberal Democracies," World Politics 43, no. 4 (July 1991):  481. 
18 Ibid, 502. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid, 482. 
21 Shapiro and Page, “Foreign Policy and the Rational Public,” 244. 
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Their definition of unbiased refers to coverage free from “systematic misinformation” 
borne of framing constructed using, for example, nationalistic or anticommunist 
terminology and “experts.”22 This same position strongly implies that framing in 
mainstream American journalism, a result of bias, could lead to a weakening of the 
democratic process, due to a confused or misinformed public. This places a grave 
responsibility upon the mainstream news media in terms of getting it right, and on being 
as objective as possible, particularly in news stories about United States foreign policy as 
it relates to conflicts, peacekeeping, or its own national security.  
 
News Coverage’s Influence on American Public Opinion 
In a 1987 study, Page, Shapiro and Dempsey attempted to determine who and 
what, exactly, moves public opinion of ordinary Americans. Their research concluded 
that the “greatest mover of public opinion” was the news analysis and commentary done 
by prominent journalists, and that one reason was because of their perceived nonpartisan 
status.23  Elected officials were found to have no persuasive effect in the study, except for 
popular presidents; this signifies that the mainstream news media, for all the criticism it 
endures for being partisan, was at the time of that study an effective mover of public 
opinion on policy matters. A study of 32 foreign policy cases and their effects on public 
opinion showed that news stories from news anchors, foreign correspondents, or special 
commentators “had a very large effect on public opinion about foreign policy”; a single 
                                                 
22 Ibid, 246. 
23 Powlick and Katz, “Defining the American Public Opinion/Foreign Policy Nexus,” 37. 
 10 
story that fell into the category of “probably favorable” resulted in nearly six percentage 
points of opinion change.24 
Powlick and Katz suggest that the decisions made by journalists and editors in 
what stories they end up covering allows for the activation of public opinion.25   Major 
newspapers and broadcasters in America use a rubric of newsworthiness to determine 
which stories to cover:  those with violence or conflict often rise to the top, as do stories 
involving a degree of familiarity. It is these stories that rely on familiarity to resonate that 
run the risk of bias. Sometimes the journalist overemphasizes the Eurocentric focus on 
foreign policy coverage; at other times, journalists focus their attention on how the story 
affects Americans abroad. 26  
What’s more, the literature on how public opinion impacts American foreign 
policy shows that states with highly active “societal actors” are states in which public 
opinion generally plays a “major role” in foreign policy.27  Risse-Kappen writes that 
these societal actors, which he suggests are organizations and social coalitions that can 
express grievances, mobilize societal pressure and raise demands, could be the missing 
link between mass public opinion and elite decisions made on foreign policy.28 
Conceivably, the robust news media landscape like the one in the United States falls 
under this definition.  
 
                                                 
24 Jordan and Page, "Shaping Foreign Policy Opinions,” 234. 
25 Powlick and Katz, “Defining the American Public Opinion/Foreign Policy Nexus,” 40. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Risse-Kappen, “Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal 
Democracies,” 486. 
28 Ibid, 484-86. 
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News Coverage’s Influence on Foreign Policy Makers 
There are several examples of media reports spurring immediate action by 
policymakers. On December 4, 1992, President George H. W. Bush announced that he 
was sending US troops to the Horn of Africa, saying, “Every American has seen the 
shocking images from Somalia.”29  An even more powerful example comes from April 
16, 1991, when President Bush announced he was sending U.S. troops to aid Kurdish 
refugees huddled in the cold of the mountains on the Iraq-Turkey border after fleeing 
bombing from Saddam Hussein’s army.30 Bush had, at several points in the previous two 
weeks, said the United States was very limited in what it could do to help the Kurds; on 
April 3, he had said he did not want to “see us get sucked into the internal civil war inside 
Iraq.”31  But reporters were already on the ground having covered the conflict, and their 
transmission of video and photographs of mothers burying their children in makeshift 
mountain graves and of children with chemical burns created a sense of urgency and a 
human desire among the public to respond. Indeed, Bush even mentioned the press 
coverage in his April 16 news conference, saying, “No one can see the pictures or hear 
the accounts of this human suffering—men, women and most painfully of all, innocent 
children—and not be deeply moved.”32  Richard Haass, who served on Bush’s National 
Security Council, said he believed television “probably had the greatest impact at this 
time in pushing us through the various phases of policy than at any time during the [Gulf] 
                                                 
29 Warren Strobel, Late-Breaking Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: US Institute of 
Peace Press, 1997), 141. 
30 Ibid, 127-131. 
31 Ibid, 128. 
32 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, George Bush, 1991, Book I 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), 321. 
 12 
crisis.”33  The news media further impacted this issue by pointing out that the president 
had encouraged the Iraqi people to rise up against Saddam Hussein, questioning the 
president about his role or responsibility for the Kurds’ outcome. As State Department 
spokeswoman Margaret Tutwiler would later characterize the media pressure, the 
administration was “taking on a lot of water,” and acted as a result of that pressure.34 
There even exists a term for media having an immediate impact on changing 
foreign policy:  the CNN Effect. In her autobiography, former Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright said she once referred to CNN as “the sixteenth member of the [UN] 
Security Council because the cable network had more influence on Council decisions 
than most governments.”35 Several studies have concluded that news media coverage 
affects both agenda setting and policy preferences, and that the contents of those media 
reports bear consequences on the global stage.36  Because of this, it becomes even more 
imperative that journalists are relaying an accurate, comprehensive portrait of the 
scenario so that policymakers are working from a position of facts. 
 
Bias and “Framing” in Foreign Policy News  
Journalists often use “frames” to craft a storyline in a way that is relevant and 
understandable to their audience.37 This can be a useful tool in helping readers or viewers 
conceptualize and apply the news report in ways that are personal to them. However, 
                                                 
33 Strobel, Late-Breaking Foreign Policy, 128. 
34 Strobel, Late-Breaking Foreign Policy, 129. 
35 Madeleine Albright, Memo to the President Elect: How we can restore America’s 
Reputation and Leadership, (New York: Harper Collins, 2008), 126. 
36 Jordan and Page, "Shaping Foreign Policy Opinions,” 228. 
37 Powlick and Katz, “Defining the American Public Opinion/Foreign Policy Nexus,” 36. 
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“framing” can also have a negative effect when it causes the story to leave the reader with 
an inaccurate understanding, often by omitting facts pertinent to the overall 
understanding.  
“Framing” and bias in the context of journalism are often used interchangeably, 
but they are not the same. “Framing” is far more intentional, usually with a purpose and 
intended outcome. Bias is usually more inherent and often unintentional; in theory, it is 
“a tendency, an inclination, or a bent that makes it difficult for us to communicate 
without prejudice.”38  Essentially, bias is what causes someone to frame a story in a 
certain way.  
There are different ways to analyze bias in the field of journalism.  First, there is 
individual bias of each reporter and editor, which is unavoidable and exists because of a 
person’s background and life experiences.  Then there is structural bias of journalism as a 
professional practice, which is much more deeply ingrained in the newsrooms and 
schools of journalism—the field of journalism itself, in other words—and which can take 
many forms.39  
Some types of “framing” are in terms of identity, such as an “us vs. them” 
frame.40 A 1997 study of 21 Illinois residents showed that people who encountered a 
media story that either had a “human impact frame” or a “familiarity frame,” in which 
readers were able to identify with one party in the story, were much more likely to have a 
strong opinion on the matter.41 This is one example of how media bias, whether intended 
                                                 
38 Andrew Cline, “Bias,” in 21st Century Communication: A Reference Handbook, ed. 
William Eadie (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2009), 479. 
39 Cline, “Bias,” 483. 
40 Powlick and Katz, “Defining the American Public Opinion/Foreign Policy Nexus,” 36. 
41 Ibid. 
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or not, can impact public opinion which, as we have identified above, can in turn 
influence foreign policy. 
TV reports on foreign policy often use what Powlick and Katz refer to as “episodic 
frames” that contain very little important contextual information on which the public 
could make a sound judgment.42  An “episodic frame” follows a narrative bias crafted for 
the purpose of framing.43  
This relates to foreign policy journalism because the public evaluates foreign 
policy issues through cognitive filters of their own belief systems, relying heavily on 
what is most familiar and known.44  This combination—journalists portraying foreign 
policy stories in familiar, often Eurocentric “frames” and the public only taking interest 
in the familiar—make conditions ripe for bias and stereotyping to spread. 
 
How Media Bias Can Impact the Foreign Policy Process 
So far in this thesis, I have argued that a) public opinion helps shape American 
foreign policy, b) select news media outlets directly affect public opinion on foreign 
policy, c) news media can directly influence the actions of foreign policymakers, and d) 
bias in “framing” of foreign policy news stories can affect the attitudes and perceptions of 
events and issues happening abroad. 
But why does this matter? Scholars have voiced concern that media commentators 
and journalists hold such “potency” in the foreign policy process, because if they are 
biased, for example with ties to interest groups, then that bias could cast a “disturbing” 
                                                 
42 Ibid, 43. 
43 Cline, “Bias,” 479-486. 
44 Powlick and Katz, “Defining the American Public Opinion/Foreign Policy Nexus,” 44. 
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shadow on a process meant to be in line with other democratic processes and values.45 If 
systematic biases are not considered in foreign policy news coverage, then that pollutes 
the news coverage and affects the democratic nature of the foreign policy process.46   
In his book Media and Political Conflict, Gadi Wolfsfeld says journalists can 
influence the conflicts they cover in two ways: by altering the balance of power through 
raising the profile of the party deemed the “challenger” and leading a party to change its 
tactics, strategy or behavior. This means that, beyond just affecting the democratic nature 
of the foreign policy process, media bias can result in tangible outcomes on the ground.  
In one example of bias in American attitudes toward foreign policy, Page and Shapiro 
found in their research that, since the establishment of the modern national state of Israel 
in 1948, most Americans “and most of the U.S. media” have felt strong cultural ties to 
Israel, and in disputes, Americans have “favored” Israelis rather than Arab countries or 
Arab nationalist movements.47  Conceivably, this could have ramifications on the US role 
in brokering a peace settlement between the two parties.  
Edward Said, a political activist and literary critic, wrote extensively about what 
he saw as “misrepresentations and distortions committed in the portrayal of Islam” by 
American mainstream journalism, particularly in matters involving conflict with Israel.48 
Ironically, Edward Said himself is a good example of bias, and even “framing,” in his 
writing on the Israeli-Palestinian crisis.  Part of this was his own inescapable personal 
bias; born in Jerusalem, his Palestinian family left for Cairo in 1947 as conflict arose over 
                                                 
45 Jordan and Page, "Shaping Foreign Policy Opinions: The Role of TV News," 237. 
46 Ibid, 238. 
47 Shapiro and Page, “Foreign Policy and the Rational Public,” 237. 
48 Said, Covering Islam, xlviii. 
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the United Nations partition of Palestine.49  After becoming a professor at Columbia 
University, he was elected to the Palestinian legislature in exile, the Palestinian National 
Council, in 1977.50 Although he supported a peaceful solution to end the political crisis 
between Israel and Palestine, Said was an outspoken critic of the Oslo peace process that 
would have ushered in a two-state solution. He fiercely portrayed Israel as a perpetrator 
of injustice and the Palestinians as victims, his own form of narrative bias.51 
Despite the cynicism found in much of Said’s writing, his work Covering Islam is 
useful because it is one of the few books that investigates specifically how some 
American journalists have used narrative framing to portray Israel as an underdog, and a 
familiar one to the West, at that.  Said suggests that this framing is intentionally promoted 
by the Israeli government, and that it is “designed to obscure what it is that Israel and the 
United States, as ‘Islam’s’ main opponents, have been doing.”52 Whether this is true or 
not will not be examined here; it is worth noting, however, that the concept of media 
providing a blurry picture, or even a smokescreen that allows foreign policy officials to 
avoid accountability is worth serious investigation. This media narrative bias, Said 
contends, provided a smokescreen for the United States and Israel to bomb and invade 
Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Libya, Somalia and Iraq over the decades.53 He says the American 
mainstream press has largely followed an Israeli-led public relations campaign to 
characterize Palestinians as “sub-human,” a plan that has been shown to influence United 
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States Middle Eastern policy.54 This is an example of the news media applying a 
narrative bias through “framing,” since it creates a clear plot with a protagonist and an 
antagonist.55 
 In addition to disrupting the democratic process, it could be argued that both bias 
and “framing” in America’s coverage of the Middle East have humanitarian and national 
security ramifications as well. However, the purpose of this thesis is not to examine the 
tangible outcomes of that media bias, but rather to identify the factors that lead to that 
bias so that the journalists’ coverage of such events is as comprehensive and as accurate 
as possible. I do aim to identify in the following pages of press analysis that there is 
indeed a bias in mainstream American news coverage of the Middle East, and that, based 
on the literature aforementioned, this bias weakens the democratic process and can lead 
to a less objective approach to conflict resolution in a region where the United States is 
still a significant player. 
In this thesis, I am specifically focusing on the stereotypes and cultural bias that 
has occurred, and continues to occur to a lesser degree, in the coverage of Islam and the 
Arab world. That is not to say that bias is absent from other ethnic groups, religions and 
nationalities in the Middle East; it is the bias toward Islam and Arab culture, however, 
that appears to still be most widespread. To grasp the breadth and history of this bias and 
“framing” in American news coverage of the Middle East, I refer to the work of Edward 
Said, author of Orientalism and Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts 
Determine How We See the Rest of the World.56 
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HISTORY OF BIAS IN NEWS COVERAGE OF ISLAM AND THE 
ARAB WORLD 
 
          Edward Said, in his book Covering Islam, contends that Americans largely learn 
about Islam through the news media. What’s more, Americans have scant opportunity to 
view the Islamic world except through the media, which Said argues gives an extremely 
reduced portrait of Muslims.57 Said is careful to clarify that when he writes about Islam, 
he does not mean to suggest that there is one, uniform version of the religion. He 
discusses Islam, he says, as interpretations of the faith that manifest themselves in human 
acts.58  Whereas one, “real” Islam does not exist in the Muslim world, the American 
media have “portrayed it, characterized it, analyzed it” to the point of making it, or at 
least a popular perception of it, known.59  There is, therefore, now a perceived, uniform 
version of Islam among the general American population. The problem is, Said contends, 
this familiarity Americans now have with Islam is based on “far from objective material,” 
including severe ethnocentrism and cultural hatred. 
Part of this animosity may derive from fear of the unfamiliar, or the other. Said 
presents a strong argument that existential or historical context matters, particularly in 
American news coverage of Islam. Without this context, he writes, stories on Muslims in 
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conflict “in effect vitiate anything like the reporting of what takes place on the ground 
and deny it from inhabiting a more humane and more understandable context.”60 Part of 
the source of this bias is because reporters do not know the predominant language of the 
people on whom they are reporting.61  During the first days of the Iranian hostage crisis 
in Tehran, for example, there were approximately three hundred foreign reporters—and 
not a Persian-speaker among them.62  
Language is one area where reporters often fall short of fully understanding a 
given situation abroad. Another area is knowledge of the hadith and The Qur’an, because 
it is interpretations of these religious texts that help lead different groups of people to 
respond differently to the same situation.  It is imperative for journalists covering the 
region to have a knowledge and familiarity with early sources of Islam—including The 
Qur’an, hadith, and sira, because they allow the reporter to provide a more accurate 
portrayal.63 
Edward Said offers tips for American journalists who hope to responsibly cover 
the Islamic world:  first, isolate the basic teachings of The Qur’an. Second, realize there 
are many different sects, jurisprudential schools and linguistic theories. Third, they need 
to understand the “sheer historical duration of the venture of Islam,” including the 
seventh century advent of the faith and the vast area that was involved.64 Journalists also 
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need to be aware of how quickly officials in the Muslim world resort to using religion as 
a justification for legitimacy or to maintain political control and stability.65   
Edward Mortimer, a commentator and editorial writer for The Times of London, 
also suggests that journalists’ lack of knowledge and familiarity with Middle East culture, 
history and religion leads to a “hostile” form of biased coverage. He himself was deemed 
an “expert” on the Middle East after a three-week tour of Israel, Jordan, Egypt and 
Lebanon, an “overnight” expertise he continued to remain sheepish about for decades.66 
In December of 1988, researchers at The Ohio State University and Cornell 
University conducted a study on 512 American adults’ attitudes toward Israel and the 
Palestinians in terms of foreign policy. The results showed a 3:1 ratio of those who 
sympathized with Israel to those who were more sympathetic to Palestinians.67 This 
suggests there is a “master narrative” of a storyline with characters who tend to behave in 
consistent roles.68  
One way in which bias creeps in is through the promotion of the idea that the 
Islamic world defines itself almost exclusively by what happens beyond its borders. Said 
suggests that it is a “condescending” approach, as well as being shallow and inaccurate, 
“to conceive of the whole Islamic world as bothered by only by what after all is external 
to it.”69 When the media portray Muslims as only having external concerns, it’s another 
way of reducing the political and cultural richness required for accuracy. 
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PRESS ANALYSIS AND CONTEXT OF MIDDLE EAST COVERAGE 
 
The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict  
              Contextual background of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. According to 
early biographer Ibn Ishaq, Muhammad reported having had an extraordinary experience 
one night as he lay in a state “midway between sleep and wakefulness.”70 In what The 
Quran calls a “vision,” Muhammad said he was visited by Gabriel and placed astride a 
miraculous white, winged steed. Muhammad said the creature flew him from the Ka’ba 
to “Al-Masjid Al-Aqsa,” translated as “the farthest place of prostration.”71 This 
destination has come to be understood as Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, although some 
early traditions interpreted it to mean a place in heaven.72 That part of Muhammad’s 
experience would come to be known Islamic heritage as the isra’, or journey.73 What 
followed was the account of the miraj, or ascension: Muhammad said he soared with 
Gabriel from a nearby rock up to the gates of heaven. When he reached the highest level 
of heaven, Muhammad said, he encountered God.74 
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 The effect Muhammad’s Isra’ and Miraj has had on the current Palestinian-Israeli 
crisis is significant; it is what makes Jerusalem, and Al-Aqsa Mosque in particular, 
Islam’s third holiest site, adding Islam to the other faiths which had already laid claim to 
the Holy Land. Today, Al-Aqsa Mosque—the place where Muslims believe Muhammad 
led the prophets in prayer—rests in East Jerusalem, the predominantly Arab part of the 
city.  The mosque is part of an ancient compound that is known as the Temple Mount to 
Jews and the Noble Sanctuary to Muslims.  Since Jews believe the place where Al-Aqsa 
Mosque currently stands is also the site of King Solomon’s temple, the foundation is 
incredibly significant for Jews and Muslims alike.   
 The rock from which Muhammad is believed to have ascended is now part of one 
of Jerusalem’s most recognizable structures: the brilliant, gold-and-turquoise mosque 
known as the Dome of the Rock.  Jewish tradition holds that the rock inside is where 
Abraham bound his son, Isaac, with the intention of sacrificing him. Muslims are 
concerned that Israel’s more conservative citizens are planning to take over the site and 
build a third and final temple there. 
 Israeli authorities, upon capturing the area in the 1967 Six Day War, chose to 
embrace a status quo agreement that made the Jordanian Waqf civil administrators of the 
site and declared only Muslims are allowed to worship there.  Despite that this 
arrangement has become increasingly unpopular in recent years among some religious 
Jews, the official Israeli position remains unchanged. Jews and Christians who are caught 
praying on the Temple Mount are asked by authorities to leave immediately.75 
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 The Name “Allah” as it relates to Monotheism. From a linguistic point of view, 
the name Allah implies singularity.  The Arabic word for the general “god” or “deity” is 
“ilah,” but when the definite article “Al,” or “the,” is added onto the front, the “l” 
sounding consonant is doubled and the word becomes “Al-lah,” meaning “The God,” and 
denoting oneness.   
Indeed, today’s Arab Christians and Jews also use the name Allah in their sacred 
texts and when referring to God in their churches and synagogues. A Bible in Arabic 
refers to God as Allah from Genesis to the Book of Revelation. Just as the French use 
“Dieu” and the Germans “Gott,” Allah is, quite simply, the word for God in the Arabic 
language. The Jewish and Christian Arabs of pre-Islamic Arabia believed in Allah as the 
deity of the “people of the scriptures.”76 Much confusion has been caused by the West’s 
portrayal of the Muslim’s concept of God as an Eastern, mysterious deity named Allah. 
Often, this is due to a mere failure to translate the word “Allah” to the English word 
“God.”  Renowned historian Albert Hourani wrote that the perception in the West has, for 
generations, been that “Allah is not God” and that, following that line of thought, “Islam 
is a false religion.”77 This frame portraying the deity of the Muslims as a “foreign” god in 
mainstream media promotes an “us versus them” frame of reference, which, as we saw 
earlier in the thesis, can have ramifications on public opinion and foreign policy. 
Due to mainstream America’s familiarity with Judeo-Christian culture and 
sources, the majority of Americans at least have some understanding of why Jerusalem is 
sacred to Jews and Christians. After all, it’s where many of the stories of the Bible are 
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set, including where Jesus walked and preached. Religion scholar Diarmaid MacCulloch 
refers to Christianity as the “daughter religion” of Judaism.78 
In mainstream newspapers like The New York Times and The Washington Post, 
Christians and Jews who speak something other than English are often quoted as 
invoking “God,” but Muslims speaking Arabic or Farsi or Urdu are said to invoke 
“Allah.” One is translated into English; the other maintains its original language. The 
effect is that one feels like the “same God” most Americans are familiar with, and the 
latter feels much more foreign, which is likely to produce an unnecessary bias, or a 
“frame” depicting “the other” that could have ramifications on public opinion, diplomacy 
and conflict resolution.   
For example, reporter Nichole Christian wrote in The New York Times of a street 
scene where “Jewish fathers pass Muslim fathers clutching the Koran, each on the way to 
pray to God or to Allah.”79  The same reporter contributed to a story two weeks later that 
involved a sentence about Muslims protesting with “chants of outrage…until the rally 
ended in prayers to Allah.”80 In a 2012 article about Gaza civilians mourning children 
killed in an Israeli air strike, The New York Times described “fingers jabbing the air to 
signal, ‘Allah is the only one,’ even though the previous paragraph had used the term 
“God.”81 
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Another way that familiarity is gained is through repetition or frequency in the 
press; Edward Said, in his book Covering Islam, contends that the American media have 
portrayed a skewed, reduced image of Islam for so long and with such frequency that it is 
now deemed “known,” even though it is not an objective view.82 Similarly, a database 
search of the phrase “Temple of Solomon” turns up 820 results for articles in the past ten 
years in The New York Times; a search of the same database for “Al-Aqsa Mosque” turns 
up merely 167.83 
 The Israeli-Palestinian crisis is extremely complex, but its main points of 
contention can be contained to four critical issues. One is the issue of Israeli settlements, 
or Jewish townships, which keep popping up on land inside the West Bank, an area 
primarily designated as Palestinian territory. Another dilemma is what to do with the 
millions of Palestinian refugees scattered throughout the region and the world. A third 
area of disagreement has been where to place borders for any future Palestinian state. The 
fourth critical debate within the crisis is over who will control Jerusalem and administer 
the city and its sacred sites. 
 It is about that fourth point—the borders and control of Jerusalem and its sacred 
sites—that we investigate press coverage here. The second Palestinian Intifada, or 
political uprising, began in 2000 when then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon visited the Al-
Aqsa mosque compound. A visit by any other Israeli leader may not have provoked such 
a fierce response, but to Palestinians, the name Ariel Sharon was synonymous with the 
1982 massacres within the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps in Lebanon, events for 
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which an Israeli commission found Sharon to bear indirect “personal responsibility” in 
his role as Defense Minister.84 
 The site came into the news again when Israel began excavations near the Al-
Aqsa mosque in February, 2007. Palestinian Muslims showed up in the thousands to riot, 
with the belief that Israel’s real motive was to damage the foundation of the mosque. The 
Israeli government dismissed those claims as “rubbish,” saying the construction work 
was necessary to build a walkway to the Dome of the Rock.85 
 Many Palestinians resent the fact that their holy sites and much of the land they 
live on exists under Israeli control. East Jerusalem has existed in this state ever since 
Israel captured it from Jordan in the 1967 “Six Day War,” creating a unified Jerusalem 
that Israel sees as its eternal capital.  
In its coverage of skirmishes and debate over the sovereignty of Jerusalem, 
mainstream American media tend to focus on how many people from each side were 
injured or killed—and what effect that could have on the peace process. A 2015 article in 
The New York Times on fighting at Al-Aqsa Mosque mentioned that the site was holy to 
both Muslim and Jews; it explained the significance to Jews as a place of “two ancient 
temples believed to have once stood at the holy site,” but did not mention why it 
was sacred to Muslims.86  A 2015 article in The Washington Post about more conflict 
explained why the site is sacred to Jews, writing that “It’s the site of the first and second 
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Jewish temples,” but made no mention of why it was sacred to Muslims.87 What’s more, 
this article and many others across mainstream media outlets often translate the Hebrew 
and Jewish sacred sites into English—like “Temple Mount” instead of Har HaBayit—
while referring to the Islamic sites by their Arabic names, such as “Al-Aqsa Mosque” 
instead of “The Farthest Mosque.”  This, too, has the potential to create a bias among 
readers and listeners who may find it harder to relate to the foreign names with no 
personal connection.88 
               How Islam, Christianity and Judaism differ in monotheism. In the year 610 
C.E., as the Eastern Roman Empire trudged through misrule and disorganization, 
Muhammad said he had heard the first verses of the greater volume that would come to 
be known as Al-Qur’an, meaning simply, “The Recitation.”89 With more confidence than 
Muhammad himself appears to have held at the time, his wife, Khadija, pledged loyalty 
to the belief that her own husband was a prophet of the one true God, a messenger chosen 
to warn and guide his people to the straight path, similar to Moses, Noah and the 
esteemed prophets of old.90 This book—a combination of poetry and prose, coming 
together bit by bit—would be the primary sacred text of Islam.91  
This principle—that there was one divine deity and that it would show humans 
the enlightened way once again, this time through communicating it to Muhammad—was 
simple, and a far cry from the more comprehensive, organized religion Islam would 
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quickly develop into. However, this basic theme would remain the epitome of the faith 
throughout the centuries. It is still all one must profess to believe in to be acknowledged 
as a Muslim today: that there is no god but God, and that Muhammad was God’s 
messenger.92 
A few years after Muhammad began preaching, the state of affairs deteriorated for 
the small group of early Muslims. They began to face persecution because of their 
disruption to the status quo, leading Muhammad to make one of his first landmark 
political decisions. He urged them to flee to someone he was confident would protect 
them as political refugees. According to biographer Ibn Ishaq, 83 Muslims set off into the 
waves of the Red Sea in an uncertain migration to the land of Abyssinia, modern-day 
Ethiopia.93 They hoped to appeal to the land’s Christian king for safe haven in his realm 
of monotheism. The Abyssinian king, known by Arab historians as Al-Najashi, 
wholeheartedly granted the refugees the political asylum they sought. This was most 
likely the ruler Armah, who held the scepter during the waning years of the great Aksum 
dynasty.94 After the Quraysh non-Muslims sent an envoy to have the refugees returned, 
the Christian king dismissed the two Qurayshi envoys, swearing that he would never 
retract his pledge of sanctuary.95  
This was just the beginning of a long, intimate bond between two religious 
communities that, in recent years, have seen turmoil and at times extreme discontent with 
one another. Muhammad taught his followers that out of all the previous religious 
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communities, the Christians were the most pure in heart, and would always be the closest 
to Muslims.96 Unfortunately, it is the Muslim world and the “West”— the latter of which 
is still heavily influenced by Christian culture and values—that are most at odds with one 
another today.  
Islam, translating directly as “submission,” was not, in Muhammad’s eyes, a new 
religion at all. It was, he believed, rather a continuation of the message that God had been 
revealing to humankind throughout the ages: worship one God and walk in his ways.  
Muhammad regarded the previous monotheistic prophets as brothers in faith, righteous 
men who had been chosen by the same God to spread fundamentally the same faith.  
 The Qur’an’s numerous reminders that “to every nation has come a guide,” 
coupled with the vivid passages of their trials, gave Muhammad’s own calling a greater 
sense of depth and continuity.97 He was soon to hear from Gabriel, however, that his own 
apostleship was to be unique in two substantial features. First, Muhammad was to be 
God’s final messenger sent to humankind; none would come after him. Second, and 
much as a result, rather than teaching one community or people, Muhammad was to 
proclaim the good news to all of humankind, and the message had to prevail from the 
moment he first heard it until Judgment Day. 
 Muhammad’s early days in Medina, where he established an Islamic state, gave 
leniency to the “People of the Book,” or Jews and Christians as long as they paid the jizya 
tax, which was a yearly, per capita tax placed on non-Muslims living under Islamic 
governance.  If they abided by that, they were permitted to retain their own religions and 
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identities apart from Islam. This would change later, after the Muslim community had 
become more powerful militarily.98 One of Muhammad’s first political moves in Medina 
was to guarantee religious freedoms for the minority Jews:  “To the Jew who follows us 
belong help and equality…the Jews have their religion and the Muslims have theirs,” 
Muhammad included in the Constitution of Medina. 99  
                Tensions between Muslims and Jews in early Islam. It was anything but 
peaceful the day Muhammad approved the beheading of approximately 700 men from 
one of the largest Jewish tribes of Arabia, the Banu Qurayza, after he had established an 
Islamic state in Medina. Ibn Ishaq records the incident, as does the hadith collector 
Bukhari, who also reported that Muhammad ordered the widows and children of the 
executed men to be distributed among the Muslims as slaves.100 
Muhammad contended that the Jewish tribe had breached its pact with him and 
instead gave its allegiance to the enemy Meccan army, thus constituting treason, for 
which there was no place in a society still acting largely by tribal norms. Islamic 
apologist scholars argue that the mass execution was in line with the 7th Century penal 
codes in place at the time.101 The land, homes and wealth of the executed Jewish tribe 
were distributed among the Muslim community as war booty.102 Some Jewish groups 
today contend that this was nothing less than an act of genocide, especially since 
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Muhammad had previously evicted the only other large Jewish tribes from Medina.103 
Mainstream journalists in the United States and worldwide must be familiar with this 
critical event involving these two monotheistic ethnic groups and recognize how it still 
wields significance on today’s interactions between Jews, Muslims and Christians in the 
Middle East.  
This act of violence, however, was not the norm between the new community of 
Muslims and the Jewish tribes: the majority of inhabitants in Medina when Muhammad 
arrived there was Jewish.104 They rejoiced when learning that Muhammad had initially 
instructed his followers to pray facing Jerusalem and the Jewish chieftans were, for the 
most part, content with Muhammad’s governing legal document, the “Constitution of 
Medina.”105   
 
ISIS, Al-Qaida, and other Islamist militant groups 
             Contextual background of ISIS, Al-Qaida and other Islamist militant 
groups.  Muhammad was a military leader; he clearly believed war was acceptable under 
certain circumstances. Up until the time Muhammad migrated to Medina, he had believed 
it was his obligation to endure insult and overlook his enemies’ faults.106 Then came the 
revelation that opened up a new era in Islamic history:  “Permission is given to those who 
fight because they have been wronged. God is well able to help them, Those who have 
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been driven out of their houses without right, Only because they said ‘God is our 
Lord.’”107 
The tone of this verse mirrors Muhammad’s early approach to warfare: initially, 
his stance on fighting would be a defensive one. He originally allowed fighting in three 
instances only:  in self-defense of lives and property, when coming to the aid of those 
who cannot defend themselves, and when Muslims are prevented the freedom to practice 
their religion. 
Still, Muhammad led many military campaigns; battles and skirmishes defined 
most of his ministry, and warfare was a factor in the early spread of Islam. Some of those 
skirmishes were raids on caravans of rivals, and the hadith relaying the first major battle 
born of such a skirmish, the Battle of Badr, record contradictory accounts.108 Some 
scholars point out that a raid is not done in self-defense, but rather in greed and plunder; 
Muslim apologists argue that the raids were conducted in what was already considered a 
time of war. Some historians such as Karen Armstrong suggest the caravan raid, or 
ghazu, was not seen as immoral “unless you stole the goods of kinsmen or 
confederates.”109 Once again, this cultural context may shine light onto the actions and 
behaviors of communities and events from long ago that still bear some relevance to 
modern day.  Muhammad used many tactics, including the promise of war booty and 
marriages between tribes, to unite the tribes of Arabia and bring them under the fold of 
Islam, which he largely succeeded in doing before his death.110 
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               Media and the question: ‘Why Do They Hate Us?’  It’s been said that 
religion has been used for the purposes of war, power, land and money. On the crisp, 
clear Tuesday morning of September 11, 2001 it was used as an outlet for anger, and for 
revenge.  In a televised address to a joint session of Congress, President George W. Bush 
gave his answer to the question which millions of his constituents were asking: Why do 
they hate us?  
He said in his speech the perpetrators hate what they see in the chamber before 
him:  a democratically elected government.  “They hate our freedoms: our freedom of 
religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each 
other,” he said.111 He was partly right in that the followers of Al-Qaida wanted to 
ultimately establish a Caliphate in which Sharia, or Islamic law, governed. 
But the American people needed, and deserved, more of an explanation, a 
religious and historical context to these attacks, and one that wasn’t simply a reduction of 
stereotypes for simplicity’s sake. There was, and still is resentment on the Arab street 
toward the government of America because of its long, murky involvement in the region. 
In large part, today’s citizens in the Arab world are able to draw a clear line between the 
American people and the American government’s foreign policy in the Muslim world.  
The vast majority of the Arab world takes offense to only the latter.  
Even before World War One—but especially right after it—Europe’s major 
powers, Britain and France, were instrumental in shaping today’s Middle East, including 
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carving up borders out of the remnants of the fallen Ottoman Empire.112 But American 
government’s involvement in the Arab world didn’t begin in earnest until after World 
War Two, when its strength as a major world power was solidified and it began to 
aggressively pursue its interests abroad. CIA-aided coups in Iran and Iraq in the 1950s 
and 60s ousted those rulers who had declared that their nations’ oil would be self-
controlled.113 Later, the US-supported economic sanctions against Iraq’s Saddam Hussein 
created suffering among the Iraqi civilians, who were without the basic necessities of 
food and medicine while their corrupt leader continued dining on gold-plated china. 
Arab civilians are very savvy when it comes to their region’s history; it has 
become an element of the pan-Arab culture to be familiar with the past century’s sum of 
regional history, and that history is discussed and often incorporated into family and 
social gatherings. The same historical points of pride, angst and grief are often passed 
down from generation to generation.  
But there is one factor that has fanned the flames of Arab anger towards America 
for generations now:  the United States’ ongoing financial and political support of the 
modern-day state of Israel.  Many Muslims worldwide hold the view that modern Israel 
was created on stolen Palestinian land in 1948, and that the tiny, developed state 
continues to thrive, in part, because of vast American foreign aid.  For decades, the Arab 
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world has taken note as America has largely overlooked Israel’s human rights record 
regarding the Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza. 
The danger—extremism, as displayed by terrorism—enters into the picture when 
a small group of affected individuals decides to “retaliate,” viewing the scenario as a state 
of war.  These individuals do not have the means to go head-to-head with a formal army, 
so they go for “soft” targets, like civilians. These militant individuals devise their own 
rulings, citing that, since all members of a democracy can vote, they are just as guilty as 
their leaders whom they elect, and therefore are deemed legitimate targets by 
extremists.114  
The American mainstream news media, in reporting on President Bush’s speech, 
could have filled in the gaps of context regarding the anger harbored both by the 
extremists who engineered the attacks and the wider Arab street toward American foreign 
policy. The frames through which the story was told were simplistic and projected a very 
clear narrative bias, with the protagonist and antagonist appearing only in terms of the 
September 11 attacks.  The frame, however, could have been widened to incorporate 
America’s involvement with the Israeli-Palestinian crisis, American troops on what is 
deemed sacred Muslim land, and many other factors that help answer the question of 
“Why do they hate us?” 
             Reforms Muhammad made to military code. The Qur’an says that devout 
Muslims are to follow Muhammad’s example in all aspects of his life.  Muhammad was 
directly involved in the fighting and likely killed many soldiers in battle. He also enacted 
the death penalty for traitors and absconders, usually by beheading.  His early battles 
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were to keep the fledging religious group from being destroyed; later battles, fought by 
Caliphs after Muhammad’s death, focused on expanding the realm of the Islamic 
Caliphate to North Africa and the Levant.115 
While Muhammad was still alive, he would lay down several ground rules 
regarding the manner in which an army should conduct itself. In the context of medieval 
warfare, his reforms were considered revolutionary.116 He allowed fighting only once war 
had been formally declared; he allowed strikes only on actual military targets; he 
distinguished soldiers from civilians and prevented the harming of the latter.  He 
instructed that the enemy’s civilian property and livestock were not to be vandalized. 
Property of captured or killed enemies still became the spoils of war.  This included the 
wives of captured or slain men; multiple hadith and sira sources indicate these captured 
women became slaves or concubines of the Muslims, and Muhammad himself had 
multiple concubines, all of whom were slaves.   
The monks in their monasteries, the elderly, the women and children of an enemy 
tribe; all were granted protection under Muhammad.  Perhaps the most revealing aspect 
of his warfare was his treatment of enemy prisoners of war:  Muhammad instructed the 
Muslims to give the POWs their own clothes and food.  One prisoner marveled at the fact 
that his captors let him eat the bread while they kept the lesser food for themselves. 
Thus, according to Muhammad’s example, there would have been no attacks on 
September 11, 2001, because they targeted non-combatant civilians. There would not 
have been an atomic bomb on Hiroshima, and no Abu Ghraib prison scandal. His army 
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was a testament to his beliefs:  women were not required to enlist but could fight side by 
side to the men if they wanted. Nusayyba, a woman from the Ansar, received 10 wounds 
while trying to keep enemy soldiers from attacking Muhammad.  Africans, Arabs, and 
Persians fought as one corps in the Muslim army. He repeatedly reminded his followers 
that “he who does not show mercy will not be shown mercy (by God).”117 However, he 
was the came commander who ordered 700 Jewish men and boys to be beheaded for 
treason, a decision that clearly did not show mercy and that could have been avoided by 
his pardon.  It is important for journalists to be aware of all of these major events in early 
Islamic history so that they portray as accurate of a picture as possible, which allows the 
reader or viewer to deduct their own frames of reference. 
             Muhammad as head of the first Islamic State.  In 2014, an organization of 
soldiers forged a brutal path to the forefront of the world stage by declaring a new 
caliphate, or Islamic State.  The group would call itself ISIS, the Arabic definition of 
which translates as The Islamic State in Iraq and Al-Sham, with Al-Sham referring to 
parts of Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Israel and the Palestinian territories.  
Muhammad was the first head of state of an Islamic nation; as scholar John 
Esposito described him, he was “prophet, head of state, commander of the army, chief 
judge, and lawgiver.”118 Diving back into the early Islamic sources, it is clear that there 
are several similarities between Muhammad’s new state and the declaration by ISIS; 
these similarities have given ISIS legitimacy. Both have a military wing, both take 
prisoners of war as “booty,” including captive women as wives and concubines, and both 
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have resorted to warfare as a way to spread influence. They both refer to The Qur’an for 
inspiration and aim to establish the Islamic faith and respect for its laws throughout the 
world.119 
However, that is generally where their similarities end. The hadith, which are 
filled with anecdotes of Muhammad’s behavior both on and off the battlefield, portray a 
leader who saw war as a last resort and who championed the rights of even non-Muslim 
prisoners of war under his care.120 Muhammad is also recorded numerous times as 
prohibiting Muslims from punishing anyone using fire, saying that punishment by fire is 
exclusively the right of the “Lord of Fire,” or God.121 This however, did not stop ISIS 
from burning alive a captive Jordanian pilot in 2015 as part of its propaganda efforts.122  
ISIS jurists, however, respond to Muslim critics by either citing Qur’anic verse or their 
own interpretation of the hadith: in the case of the pilot burned alive, they argued that 
Muhammad was not actually forbidding punishment by fire, but was just being 
humble.123 
Muhammad, despite waging many battles in the name of Islam, was progressive 
in the context of his time in furthering the human rights of women, prisoners of war, and 
enemy combatants.124 His “Constitution of Medina” provided a framework for a diverse 
group of individuals to be governed under a common law.125  
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When considering Muhammad’s role as statesman and revolutionary, progressive 
Muslims are eager to evaluate his actions based on the context of his time period, rather 
than to judge his actions by contemporary standards. Along this line, the progressives 
assert that ISIS should be held to the standards of the era in which it exists, rather than 
hearkening back to the laws of nearly a millennium and a half ago. However, one hadith 
often recited by Islamic scholars is Muhammad’s declaration that Muslims would “never 
go astray” if they follow two things: “the book of God and the sunna of his prophet.”126 
This would appear to counter the notion that Muhammad would have progressed with the 
times.  Although this hadith is well known among Muslims and often quoted in Friday 
sermons, it was recorded by a rather obscure hadith collector, 'Ibn Musa al-Bayhaqi, and 
not by any of the six hadith collectors who are generally seen by Muslims as being the 
most authentic: Bukhari, Muslim, Ibn Majah, Tirmidhi, Nisai and Abu Dawud 
 Even if ISIS were operating in Muhammad’s day, they would still be much more 
harsh and less tolerant than he was:  Under Muhammad’s rule, for example, any 
dissenter, male or female, rich or poor, could approach Muhammad directly with a 
complaint. An entire surah in The Qur’an—called “The Chapter of the Woman Who 
Disputes”—is devoted to a woman who argued with Muhammad over the injustice of an 
old divorce custom until God revealed to Muhammad that he should adjudicate on this 
matter in her favor.127 ISIS does not appear to allow for arbitration, questioning the head 
of state, or checks and balances of any kind. 
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              Women and girls taken as spoils of war. His tenure as head of state was not 
without its harsh edicts and archaic punishments. The execution of the Jews of the Banu 
Qurayza provides the most famous example. The spoils of war under Muhammad’s 
leadership included women, children, and livestock taken as booty after winning a battle. 
Seen as separate from wives, multiple hadith and sira sources indicate these captured 
women became slaves or concubines of the Muslims.128 Drawing on this, ISIS has 
heralded its revitalization of slavery as a major institution in a return Islamic law.129  
          Evolution of the term “jihad” .  As an Islamic term, the Arabic word jihad has 
itself been on a long, winding journey. Ideologically, Muhammad referred to jihad in 
various ways, a habit that gave birth to the potential for widely different interpretations 
down the road. In one sense, according to the hadith collections believed to be the earliest 
and most accurate, Muhammad said jihad was a militant act of worship done for the sake 
of preserving Islam. In other instances, he is said to have promoted jihad as more of an 
inner, personal struggle against weakness and temptation.130 Literally, and without the 
Islamic context, the word is derived from the root verb of the Arabic consonants jeem-ha-
dal, and means “to struggle or exert oneself.”  
The word’s journey has included pit stops in the writings of 13th century Islamic 
scholar Ibn Taymiyya and his belated follower 18th century Muhammad Abd-al-Wahhab 
in the Arabian Peninsula. The term eventually took on even more grassroots significance 
in the writings of an Egyptian named Sayyid Qutb, whose ideology would go on to 
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inspire the growth of The Muslim Brotherhood and other groups that saw jihad as 
including the killing of civilians deemed to be the enemies of Islam.131 Qutb let loose the 
traditional ropes that had held back militancy in Islam and demanded that a world 
caliphate be established, a doctrine that was heartily embraced by radicals including 
Osama bin Laden.132 Qutb held that Jihad was “not for defense only, but to destroy all 
worship of false gods and remove all the obstacles which prevents men from accepting 
Islam.”133 Today, groups like ISIS are using the term to recruit Muslims who are willing 
to kill non-Muslims for the group’s political-religious cause.134  
The classical notion of jihad was not exclusively affiliated with Muslim warfare 
in Muhammad’s day. The term rarely occurs in relation to the military in The Qur’an.135 
The expansion wars that occurred after Muhammad’s death are where the term jihad 
really began to take root as a term for divine sanctioned warfare. 
Islam is unusual because of a liturgical understanding that some of the verses in 
its holy book, The Qur’an, take precedence over others. For example, the verses that 
Muhammad recited earlier in his mission, when his ministry was still fledgling and in 
need of political compromises, are trumped by more hardline verses revealed closer to his 
death.  It is this system of abrogation—which was sanctioned by Muhammad himself, 
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according to hadith collections—that means the passages about peace and tolerance are 
no longer binding, although they are often quoted without context by liberals in the West 
hoping to promote a sense of multiculturalism or peace.  It is this very context that many 
radicals have latched onto in their attempts to justify the killing of non-Muslims.136 
Ironically, there are several verses that moderates say the radicals are also taking out of 
religious and historical context. This, too, is important context for journalists to know 
when covering conflict among Islamist groups. 
          Journalism analysis of modern Islamist militant groups. On September 11, 
2001, nineteen men in the United States walked onto commercial airliners with the sole 
intention of killing everyone on board, as well as the thousands of civilians they hoped to 
crash their planes into. Their mission went largely as planned. Along with the horror and 
grieving which ensued came many questions. Who would do such an unthinkable act of 
injustice, and why?  What would drive a person to not only kill himself but thousands of 
men, women and children whom he had never met?  United States government officials 
soon announced that all nineteen individuals had come from the Arab world—the Muslim 
world. What’s more, the perpetrators appeared to have committed their crimes in the 
name of faith. Osama bin Laden, the next day, praised the efforts of the hijackers, but 
initially denied responsibility for the attacks, saying in a statement issued to the Al 
Jazeera network that he “did not plan the recent attacks” and that the leader of the 
“Islamic emirate of Afghanistan,” where he was living, did not allow him to carry out 
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such operations.137 It wouldn’t be long before the FBI linked the hijackers to the Al-
Qaida militant network.  
The spotlight was suddenly and ferociously on Islam. Journalists were thrown 
headlong into covering what had been until then a largely obscure faith in the newsroom.  
In the months that followed, numerous factual errors were made. Newsweek Magazine 
reported that The Qur’an contained 6,666 verses, a rather diabolic-sounding figure.138 It 
actually contains 6,236. Many media outlets published half-explained traditions, 
linguistic errors, or Qur'anic verses out of context. The result was a heightened state of 
distrust and confusion regarding an already unfamiliar faith and community.  
Muslim organizations began issuing a flurry of press releases, denouncing the acts 
as murder and in clear violation of Islam’s teachings.  Two days after the attacks, Sheikh 
Yousuf Al-Qaradawi, head of the enormously influential—and strict—grassroots Muslim 
Brotherhood, announced, “We, in the name of our religion, deny the act and incriminate 
the perpetrator,” and encouraged Muslims to donate blood to the victims of the attacks.139 
The chief cleric at Al Azhar University of Cairo—the top institution in Sunni 
Islam—said, “Attacking innocent people is not courageous…and will be punished on the 
day of judgment.”140 From Palestine to Bangladesh, from the Americas to the two sacred 
mosques of Mecca and Medina, top Islamic sheikhs raised their voices in their various 
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languages to categorically condemn the attacks.141 Their statements, however, appeared 
to fall on deaf ears in the United States. Even though the Associated Press and other wire 
services offered tidbits of information on Muslims taking a stand against the terrorist 
actions, these wire reports remained largely obscure and did not become major headlines 
in mainstream news outlets in the weeks and months that followed.  
 Instead, The New York Times ran a story about Christian evangelist Franklin 
Graham’s post- September 11 statement condemning “the silence of the clerics around 
the world,” in which he asked, “How come they haven't reassured the American people 
that this is not true Islam and that these people are not acting in the name of Allah, they're 
not acting in the name of Islam?''142 This short news article did not include mention of the 
fact that the clerics had, indeed, spoken out on those exact topics, leaving readers with a 
less than full picture.143 
It would have been seen as absurd for anyone to hold Christianity or Jesus 
accountable for the Ku Klux Klan lynchings of the 1960s, for example, although they 
were carried out as Bible verses were read aloud and their trademark symbol was a 
burning cross. The difference was the masses had a familiarity with Christianity—there 
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was a deep enough understanding of the faith and its true teachings for the public to know 
that Christianity, the Bible, and Jesus were not to blame for the actions of a few 
misguided, angry souls.  
Few journalists looked back to the days of Mecca and Medina to see what 
Muhammad believed about fighting, and how he commanded his followers to conduct 
themselves in times of war. As Edward Said writes in Covering Islam, this lack of 
context perpetuates a concept of “the other,” which in trying to resolving conflict, is 
counterproductive.144 
 Similarly, in June of 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Shams, or ISIS, 
delivered a message through its spokesman:  the group was now an official Islamic 
Caliphate, and whatever jihadi factions did not pledge allegiance to the new Islamic state 
would be put to death.145 The militants had barged into the Iraqi city of Mosul, claiming it 
for their conquest and ruthlessly beheading or impaling those who tried to stop them. 
Those who did not fall under the group’s narrowly defined definition of Sunni Islam were 
either put to death or taken into slavery, the fate of many women and children.146 The 
Yezidi ethnic group, in particular, took the brunt of the brutality:  human rights groups 
confirm that ISIS fighters have used rape, sexual mutilation and sterilization tactics to 
control their prisoners and prevent the reproduction of more Yezidis. Children were sent 
to training camps “erasing their identities as Yezidis.”147  
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The American press, in its coverage of ISIS, focused on the brutality. It was hard 
not to: the beheadings, the torture, the systematic murder and sexual assault of an entire 
ethnic group, the Yezidis, were grave and shocking. But when the Islamic State was 
declared, very few journalists and editors asked the question:  what is an Islamic state, 
exactly, and what is the historical model for a Caliphate? What do the original sources 
from early Islam tell us about an Islamic State?  These questions are critical for both the 
journalists covering the story and, by extension, the people reading the story to ask and 
have answered in the most comprehensive way possible. Even within jihadist groups 
there has been much debate and plenty of criticism surrounding the legitimacy and tactics 
of ISIS; in response to that criticism, a spokesman for ISIS replied: “All who try to sever 
the ranks will have their heads severed.”148 
 
The Hajj Pilgrimage 
            Contextual background of the Hajj pilgrimage.  In the middle of the sixth 
century C.E., as the first Bubonic Plague was wreaking havoc on the heart of Europe, the 
Arabian Peninsula pulsated with an assortment of religious practices.  The inhabitants of 
the land knew of and believed in “Allah,” or “The [One] God.” Beginning from the first 
chapter of the book of Genesis, “Elohim” is a word commonly used in the Hebrew 
Scriptures to refer to God.149 There were Jews and Christians settled in the peninsula, 
with the most concentrated populations of these groups based where Yemen is today. 
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Even though they maintained their own religion, both communities “were thoroughly 
Arabized” in language and community.150 There were also idols, superstitions, and 
folklore, creating a thriving culture of polytheism. 151  
Standing center stage on Arabia’s theater of religion and trade was the ancient 
city of Mecca. Nestled in a valley surrounded by jagged auburn-colored mountains, 
Mecca sits in a flash-flood plain despite being in one of the world’s harshest deserts. The 
water gushing forth from the city’s Zam-Zam spring is smooth and sweet to the taste.  
Since 1932, Mecca has been governed by the Al-Saud royal family, monarchs of Saudi 
Arabia. Before them came the Ottomans and before them, the Mamlukes and various 
tribal rulers. Having an idol in Mecca today would likely cost a Saudi his or her head; the 
city has since returned to the strict definition of monotheism which Muslims believe 
Abraham imparted there millennia ago, a belief the government enforces with austerity.  
The penal codes for what is deemed immoral behavior in Saudi Arabia are similar to 
those of ISIS, although ISIS keeps its executions public whereas Saudi Arabia tends to 
execute those found guilty in public to avoid international condemnation.152  
The Ka’ba, and Mecca in general, have come to symbolize to Muslims the basic 
themes of their religion: Monotheism, purity, and sanctity, as well as a historical 
association with Muhammad. But prior to Muhammad, in the days which he would 
eventually term Ayyam al-Jahaliyya, or “The Days of Ignorance,” the main themes of 
Mecca were the antithesis of what they were to eventually become. Idols were essential 
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to the Meccan family; they were the focus on divinity and fertility and fate.153 Idolatry 
was not just a peripheral aspect of Meccan society; its thriving economy depended on it. 
Rather than just being a desolate desert oasis, Mecca in the year 570 C.E. was, according 
to British historian Karen Armstrong, an “atmosphere of cut-throat capitalism and high 
finance.”154 The city came alive once a lunar year when traders, poets and the faithful 
would descend en masse upon the valley to venerate the idols held in the Ka’ba.  
Rituals and icons of the Hajj explained. The center of attention on the Hajj is 
not the historic site of Muhammad’s first revelation, nor of the place he was born, 
although both locations are known. The hardline Sunni scholars who are bankrolled by 
the royal family have destroyed most historic buildings relating to Muhammad’s life in 
an effort to prevent Muslims from turning them into shrines and giving Muhammad a 
status greater than he wanted. Those few sites that have not been bulldozed have 
government signs forbidding prayer or worship there.155 
Rather, the item that first-time pilgrims anxiously scan the Sacred Mosque for is 
the Ka’ba—a small, stone building in the center of the mosque, draped in the finest black 
cloth garnished with gold, embroidered calligraphy. The Ka’ba, referred to as the House 
of God, is believed to have pre-dated Muhammad, when it was part of pagan rituals.156 
Pilgrims scramble and push their way through the crowds to touch, rub, or kiss the 
building in the hopes that doing so will bring them blessings. The Ka’ba is what devout 
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Muslims turn to face when they are called to prayer five times a day, wherever they find 
themselves on earth. Next to the structure is a set of footprints petrified into the soil, 
believed by Muslims to be the imprint of the great patriarch of monotheism, the Prophet 
Abraham.157  
 Most Muslims can only dream of entering the Ka’ba. In the days of the late King 
Faisal Al-Saud, who enacted the infamous oil embargo in the 1970s, it was open to the 
public—one day a week for women and a separate day for their male counterparts. Due to 
the growing crowds since the 1970s, however, the only people permitted to enter now are 
the caretakers or special guests of the government.158 The building’s doors open for a bi-
annual cleaning ceremony, in which the caretakers enter with little more than simple 
brooms. This occurs once around the lunar month of Ramadan and again in the month of 
Dhul-Hijja. Today, the floor of the Ka’ba is marble, and thick, green curtains 
embroidered in gold Qur’anic verse adorn the interior walls. There are no windows, and 
the only objects inside are a few copies of The Qur’an and incense burners upon which 
the finest Arabian bukhoor smolders.159  
 Over the course of his ministry, Muhammad revolutionized the pilgrimage, 
changing it from a pagan celebration to a ritual that honored the strict Monotheism he 
would be known for implementing. The rituals of the pilgrimage are powerful, too. 
When pilgrims get close to the outskirts of Mecca, they are required to exchange 
their worldly clothes for simple, seamless white garments, signifying that they have 
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entered the sacred state of ihram.160 One of the reasons for this is to remind believers of 
the egalitarianism between classes that Muhammad worked hard to establish—oil sheik 
and tea boy, CEO and night-shift janitor, princess and pauper have traditionally all 
appeared as equals during the Hajj. This equality symbolizes the coming Day of 
Judgment, when the only factor human souls will have to distinguish themselves from 
others are their beliefs and good deeds. Although the socioeconomic lines were meant to 
become blurred during the Hajj, the gender boundaries remain vivid, and they’re woven 
into the firm rules of the Hajj itself. For men, the ihram garments consist of two white 
shrouds, one to drape around the waist and another to hoist over one shoulder. Women 
pilgrims must cover every part of their bodies except for their hands and faces. The 
mosque in Mecca is one of the few places where the sexes are permitted to worship side 
by side, but women must have a male mahram, or relative to chaperone them and cannot 
perform the Hajj alone. If a woman experiences the unfortunate timing of beginning her 
menstrual cycle on the Hajj, she is forbidden from stepping foot inside the Sacred 
Mosque because she is deemed unclean, and often prevented from completing the 
pilgrimage, even if she has traveled thousands of miles and waited decades to become a 
Hajja.  
Even the spirit of class egalitarianism is diminishing with the advent of travel 
agencies specializing in highly indulgent VIP tours for pilgrims who are willing to pay. 
Now, a wealthy pilgrim can relax in an air-conditioned car and zoom past the other 
believers, who must walk to the sacred sites in the desert sun. Luxury Hajj packages 
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promise seven-star hotel rooms, and for the portion of the pilgrimage that must be 
performed outdoors, sturdy tents with plush pillows and banquets of lamb and rice. The 
Ka’ba itself has been literally overshadowed since 2006, when the ultra-modern luxury 
hotel and clock tower Beit Al-Abraja went up next door to the Sacred Mosque, looming 
far over the mosque.  
 After dressing in the ihram garments, the millions of pilgrims circle the Ka’ba by 
foot, wheelchair, and on the backs of a strong son or husband, reciting prayers and verses 
from The Qur’an in a common language of Arabic. Except for the area near the Black 
Stone, this process is usually orderly, with pilgrims going in the same, counter-clockwise 
motion around the ancient structure, as Muhammad and his followers did before them. 
They scurry back and forth between two spots near the Zamzam well, imitating the 
actions of yet another figure to appear throughout the three main monotheistic religions: 
Hajar, the Arab wife of Abraham.161 
Some of the men scatter into the hillsides for a few moments of solitude, where 
from a distance, they collectively look like tiny white pearls against a dark red canvas of 
rock. They venture to the nearby village of Mina, where they throw pebbles at the upright 
jamraat stone pillars, symbolizing the stoning of the devil and a rejection of evil. Most 
often, this is the part in which pilgrims have perished in stampedes; one reason is because 
some Islamic clerics insist there is a limited window of time for the throwing of the 
pebbles.  This means vast numbers of pilgrims try to crowd into the limited space at the 
same time, often leading to injury or death.  
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Journalism analysis of the Hajj coverage. The journalism coverage of the Hajj 
is a classic example of what Edward Said refers to as “reduction” of culture to a 
simplistic, stereotypical frame. From a journalism perspective, the Hajj meets multiple 
criteria of newsworthiness: relevance, impact, timeliness, and consequence, even for an 
audience consuming news from 6,000 miles away in the United States. It’s a story that 
has significant political, religious, social, national security and public health ramifications 
each year. In years where contagious disease is a concern—like the outbreak of the 
deadly Ebola virus in 2014—the Saudi government prevents affected countries from 
participating.  
Yet most years, there is little historical or religious context to the news coverage 
of the Hajj or its specific rituals. This lack of context, as studied earlier part in this thesis, 
runs the risk of reducing and simplifying the tradition to an idea that is easier to see as 
foreign and unknown, which allows for an established narrative bias to continue.162   
In 2015, The Washington Post had three articles on the Hajj, and each was about 
that year’s deadly stampede, in which more than 700 pilgrims perished.163 CNN.com’s 
only coverage the year before, other than an online photo gallery, focused on how 
narcissism had penetrated the Sacred Mosque in Mecca by pilgrims snapping “selfies” 
during the various Hajj rituals.164 In 2015, CNN.com produced two feature stories and 
one fact sheet about the Hajj: the fact sheet included 258 words on the rituals—including 
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two brief sentences of religious context—and another 276 words on the history of 
stampedes at the event.165 The two feature stories were on the stampede and the Saudi 
government’s attempts to manage the crowd. Neither of those stories contained religious 
or historical background to the Hajj. 
The New York Times’ coverage of the Hajj in 2015 followed a similar pattern: 
nine out of the 11 stories about the pilgrimage were centered on the stampede and its 
rising death toll. As for those two remaining stories, one was about a crane accident that 
occurred shorty before the Hajj, killing 107 people, and the other was a feature report on 
a gay filmmaker making the pilgrimage. 
The staggering number of pilgrims in attendance—an estimated four million each 
year—is more than 50 times the attendance in a full Super Bowl stadium. Those figures 
alone would command a significant presence on any news site committed to covering 
international news. In this particular story, the focus is largely on catastrophes that occur 
during the event; and very few provide the historical or religious context needed to show 
the relevance of the Hajj.  
 
US Troops in Saudi Arabia 
            Contextual background of US troops in Saudi Arabia.  By the end of his life, 
Muhammad had successfully transformed his young community from a fledgling faith 
group to a sociopolitical system.166 In one of his final sermons, Muhammad is recorded as 
having said that Muslims should expel all non-believers from Jazeerat ul-Arab, the 
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Arabian Peninsula.167 Depending on which Islamic scholar you ask, this rule has different 
meanings. Individuals with more extremist tendencies, like Bin Laden, have taken the 
position that this means non-Muslims should vacate the entire Arabian Peninsula or be 
put to death.  Others say Muhammad spoke these words from the Hejaz area and only 
referred to the strip of land encompassing Mecca and Medina and not much more.  The 
cited reason for this is that the second Caliph, Umar ibn al-Khattab, who had spent many 
years by Muhammad’s side. Umar banned Jews from Khaybar and Fadak, which are in 
the Hejaz area, but not from Fayma, which was clearly still on the Arabian Peninsula.168 
In addition to the hadith, The Qur’an itself forbids non-Muslims to enter the holy 
city of Mecca.169 The Saudi government enforces the ban with no apologies—although a 
few individuals beset with curiosity, like the Englishman Sir Richard Francis Burton in 
1853, have risked their lives to sneak in and perform the Hajj under disguise. Upon his 
return to England, the Christian chronicled his illicit experiences, writing that as he 
approached the Ka’ba, it occurred to him that “a blunder, a hasty action, a misjudged 
word, a prayer or bow, not strictly the right shibboleth, and my bones would have 
whitened the desert sand.”170 Modern road signs on the highways leading into Mecca 
designate one lane for Muslims, and two lanes labeled “Obligatory for Non-Muslims,” 
the latter of which exit the highway and redirect drivers to the cities of Taif or Jeddah.171 
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             Journalism analysis of US troops in Saudi Arabia.  It was the same air of 
exclusivity, of divine responsibility to safeguard the sanctity of Mecca—and to a lesser 
extent, Medina to the north—that led former Al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden to issue 
his lengthy “Declaration of War Against the Americans Who Occupy the Land of the 
Two Holy Mosques,” an edict read around the world on August 23, 1996.172 In that 
religious call to arms, Bin Laden mentioned the Ka’ba several times, and the two sacred 
mosques featured even more prominently. Bin Laden was greatly vexed by the American 
troops that had been based on Saudi soil since the first Iraq War. In his eyes, those were 
sacred sands that wholly belonged to followers of Islam. But beyond that, he felt 
“humiliation,” he wrote, that Saudi King Fahd ibn Abdul Aziz had allowed the foreign 
troops, and in doing so had become a puppet of the “crusaders.” The walls of this 
humiliation, Bin Laden wrote, could not be destroyed “except in a rain of bullets.”173 
This fatwa, or religious ruling, was a foreshadowing of the attacks of September 
11, 2001. It was a call to arms against American troops, and his subsequent fatwa in 1998 
would call for the killing of Americans more broadly.  In their coverage of these fatwas, 
mainstream American media focused almost exclusively on the security issue. CNN 
secured an interview with Bin Laden a few months later, during which he announced that 
the United States’ presence in Saudi Arabia was an "occupation of the land of the holy 
places."174 Throughout that interview, Bin Laden referred to Saudi Arabia only as “the 
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country of the Two Holy Places,” refusing to acknowledge the ruling Al-Saud family.175 
A month after the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, The New York 
Times published a lengthy article written by journalist Peter Bergen—the former CNN 
journalist who had interviewed bin Laden—in which Bergen included one sentence of 
explanation for Bin Laden’s resentment. “In his view, the Prophet Muhammad had 
banned the permanent presence of infidels in Arabia,” Bergen wrote.176 
Most American journalism coverage of Bin Laden’s edict—and the subsequent 
diatribes he broadcast from hiding in central Asia—was extremely thin on religious or 
historical context. Even Bergen and The New York Times neglected to look into the 
religious belief that Muhammad banned non-Muslims from Arabia—or to examine the 
various interpretations of this ban. 
The reason this kind of context is important is that it allows for those on the 
receiving end of this extremism to better understand the challenge facing them. Along 
with a more comprehensive understanding comes a wider palate of options for 
approaching the situation effectively.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
In his book Covering Islam, Edward Said identifies several important 
consequences that have occurred because of American journalism’s practice of reporting 
Middle East news stories void of context, and with “patterns and values that are 
ethnocentric or irrelevant or both.”177 These consequences are as follows: a) a specific 
image, and not an accurate one, of Islam has been created; b) meanings of the stories are 
“circumscribed” and full of stereotypes; c) this news coverage has created a 
confrontational political situation with an “us against them” mentality; d) the reductive 
image of Islam has changed the Muslim world itself; and e) we have learned from the 
media’s portrayal of Islam a fair amount about the West’s institutions, politics of 
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information and national policy.178   
American journalism reports influence public opinion every day, and in rare 
cases, as identified earlier in the thesis, those reports can directly impact foreign policy 
decisions. This broad power, which can have ramifications in the humanitarian, national 
security and democratic process realms, must also come with a heavy responsibility for 
fairness, accuracy and due diligence.  
The distinguished French scholar Maxime Rodinson wrote, “Western 
Christendom perceived the Muslim world as a menace long before it began to be seen as 
a real problem.”179Albert Hourani noted that the overwhelming perception among 
citizens of the West has traditionally been that “Islam is a false religion, Allah is not God, 
Muhammad was not a prophet; Islam was invested by men whose motives and character 
were to be deplored, and propagated by the sword.”180 
Based on both the literature and news articles reviewed in this thesis, these 
stereotypes are still very much in play throughout American mainstream journalism 
coverage. One example of this is how quickly several major news organizations hosted 
“experts” who confidently linked Arabs, Muslims and Middle Easterners to the 1995 
Oklahoma City bombing of a federal building without any evidence to back up their 
claims.181 A few days after the bombing, however, it emerged that a white, Christian, 
American radical had carried out the attack. 
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As Said writes, the two things that can best counter this bias that is still inherent 
in the press are a) journalists who are very familiar with the history, language and culture 
of the people on which they are reporting, and b) much by extension of the first factor, 
more cultural context to the stories about the Middle East.182  This thesis, with the 
cultural context provided on four recurring topics coming out of the Middle East, aims to 
help the field of journalism in that endeavor.  
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